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Abstract. A problematic aspect of software management systems in
view of integrity preservation is the handling, approval, tracking and
eventual execution of change requests. In the context of the relation
between clients and repositories, trust can help identifying all packages
required by the intended installation. Negative trust, in turn, can be used
to approach the complementary problem induced by removing packages.
In this paper we offer a logic for negative trust which allows to identify
admissible and no-longer admissible software packages in the current
installation profile in view of uninstall processes. We provide a simple
working example and the system is formally verified using the Coq the-
orem prover.
1 Introduction
Software management configuration is among the most pervasive problems in
modern personal computing, with complications caused by multiplication of
users, required support for several software versions releases, increasing cus-
tomization options and the need of coordination across distributed systems. One
specific aspect of configuration management activities is change management, i.e.
the handling, approval and tracking of change requests, with the aim of preserv-
ing the integrity of the system.
Consider the following example. A user interacts with a software package sys-
tem to install or remove applications. The set of packages installed on a machine
is called the installation profile of that machine. A valid installation profile is
one which meets all the dependencies and conflicts clauses of all the packages
installed and such that it satisfies sufficient dependencies for any desired package
to be executed. Assume the current installation profile contains: two packages
φ1, φ2 from the main repository; one package ψ1 from the free repository; and
one package ξ1 from the non-free repository. Assume moreover that ψ1 depends
on φ1 and from φ2, while ξ1 depends on ψ1. Consider now the situation where
the user wishes to prevent installation of a given additional package ψn from the
free repository, while wishing to install a package ξ2 from the non-free repos-
itory: which other packages is she safe in installing? and which ones does she
need to remove in order to avoid conflicts in the new installation? Determining
these consistency relations between packages in a given installation is essential
for system stability, but also to prevent the possibility of security threats in
critical systems.
In [15], the problem of maintaining profile consistency and system integrity
in view of uninstall processes is presented in the following terms:
Definition 1. (Uninstall Problem). Given a new package φ to install, deter-
mine the minimal number of packages (possibly none) that must be removed from
the system in order to make φ installable.
This means identifying and removing all packages that are in conflict with the
intended installation and its dependencies. This version of the problem can be
complemented by that of identifying packages that depend on an undesired one.
In this context, trust can be used to characterize the relations between clients,
software packages (including their dependencies) and repositories during the
installation process. A software package in conflict with the current installation
profile can not be trusted under it and hence not installed; if already installed,
trust needs to be removed. Hence, dealing with such processes requires an explicit
treatment of negative trust. Here and in the following the term untrust is used as
neutral for ‘negative trust’ with respect to its derivatives mistrust and distrust :
the former expresses trust removal, the latter trust denial. It should be noted
that we refer to negative trust in the sense of being obtained through logical
negation, as opposed to other quantitative approaches, where negative numbers
are used. In [12] a natural deduction calculus is formulated which offers a proof-
theoretical semantics for both notions. On this basis, we adapt here the Uninstall
Problem from Definition 1 to the two semantics of untrust:
– A user identifies a package φ which generates conflict with a desired installa-
tion; to preserve profile consistency, φ is distrusted while the set of packages
not depending on φ remain installable;
– A user identifies a package φ to be installed but in conflict with the cur-
rent profile; to preserve profile consistency the packages ψi, . . . , ψn in the
installation profile in conflict with φ are mistrusted.
The Uninstall Problem from Definition 1 can then be reformulated accord-
ingly in the two variants:
Definition 2. (Distrusted Uninstall Problem) Given a package φ that should
not be installed, determine which other packages can be installed (i.e. that do not
require φ).
In this case, we are obviously interested in determining the maximal set of
installable packages that do not conflict with φ.
Definition 3. (Mistrusted Uninstall Problem) Given a package φ that should
be installed, but which is in conflict with the current profile, determine which
packages need to be uninstalled in order for φ to become installable.
As in the approach from [15], we are interested here in determining the
minimal set of packages inconsistent with φ that have to be removed from the
installation profile.
In the present paper we provide a solution to these two problems in soft-
ware management through their formalization in a logic for negative trust. In
our model we use a trust function to allow access relations that presuppose con-
sistency; in the current interpretation, trust (and hence of consistency checks)
applies to software packages and conflicts are treated through negative trust.
Note that the kind of inconsistencies we consider are not just those induced by
technical requirements of the packages, but also by security issues. This formal
strategy can help in offering a computable approach to trust management and
in reducing risks related to installation profile inconsistency. The logic allows to
reason about statements of the form:
Installation profile Γ allows consistent installation of package φ and pre-
vents installation of conflicting package ψ.
This approach is in the first place novel from a conceptual point of view, be-
cause software dependency satisfaction as trust management has not yet been
largely investigated. Secondly, it is novel from a technical point of view, as proof-
theoretic solutions and the possibility of implementation in theorem provers for
automatic inconsistency checking have been neglected so far. In comparison with
existing approaches for the resolution of inconsistent installations, our underly-
ing logic allows a finer-grained approach than, for example, SAT-solvers.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we offer an overview of related
works in the area of computational trust and software management. In Section
3 we introduce the system (un)SecureND, which provides the formal machinery
for our analysis. In Section 4 the Distrusted Uninstall Problem is reformulated
within our logic and its solution illustrated. In Section 5 the same is done for
the Mistrusted Uninstall Problem. In Section 6 we present a simple scenario
modelled by example derivations showing both cases at work. We conclude with
some general remarks and a brief overview of future work.
2 Related Work
The present work sits at the intersection of the literature on software dependency
management and computational trust. In this section we briefly overview related
works in both areas and compare those to our approach and results.
In [5], we have offered a trust-based version of the optimization problem
from [15], known as the minimum install problem, determining the optimal way
to install a new package, where optimality is determined by an objective function
to minimize the amount of dependencies satisfied such that it results in a valid
installation profile. Trust is then used to guarantee that the minimal amount of
dependencies for each newly installed package is satisfied by transitively accessed
repositories. The complementary problem of maintaining profile consistency and
system integrity in view of uninstall processes can be similarly developed by
applying the logic from [12] to the software management context.
In the context of software management, SAT solving appears as a promising
approach for the development of efficient methods of dependency graph resolu-
tion. SAT technology has been used in [9] to validate dependencies and check
installability of packages of specific Linux distribution. In Section 1 we have
illustrated our current task as resolving two variants of the Uninstall Problem
from [15]. In that work the Opium package-management tool is introduced, also
based on pseudo-boolean solvers. Opium is complete with respect to solution
finding and can optimize a user-defined function, e.g. to prefer smaller pack-
ages over larger ones. An implementation of Opium is available as the 0install
solver.1 A review of state-of-the-art package managers and their ability to keep
up with evolution and their dependency solving abilities is offered in [1], with a
proposal to treat dependency solving as a separate concern from other upgrade
aspects. The upgrade problem is also considered in [2] to justify the design of a
modular package manager. While we do not have an implementation of preferen-
tial settings based on user-choices, our installation profiles are defined according
to a criterion of minimality for dependency satisfaction: this means that we
construct installation profiles according to an ordered criterion of dependency
satisfaction and package removal from a profile always proceeds to identify the
minimal number of required packages. Also, in our approach we do not explic-
itly distinguish cases of upgrade as separate from installation of new packages:
this is clearly a simplification, but the system can deal with upgrade with the
more complex tactic of removing older versions and installing newer ones. The
solvability of the decision problem related to software dependency management
and its optimization are also considered in [3]. In the present paper our aim is
to start an investigation in a proof-theoretical and trust-based approach to soft-
ware dependency management, which so far has been neglected. We also hope
to facilitate the introduction of automated theorem provers in the area, which
can be beneficial in the checking process of intended installations in order to
anticipate possible conflicts.
An associated but distinct issue is the co-installability problem: to quickly
identify the components that can or cannot be installed together. It is related
to boolean satisfiability and it is known to be algorithmically hard. It is shown
to be especially complex for cases that include optimization by user preferences,
where a combination of exact and approximate solving can help, [7]. In [16] a
formally certified semantic method preserving graph-theoretic transformations
is developed to associate to each concrete component repository a much smaller
one with a simpler structure. One aspect of co-installability is that of reciprocal
dependencies [4], which as mentioned more explicitly later is abstracted from
in the present formulation. The Mistrusted Uninstall Problem formulated below
replicates the intuition of the co-installability problem in the setting for external
1 See http://0install.net/solver.html. An OCaml implementation
is also available at http://roscidus.com/blog/blog/2014/09/17/
simplifying-the-solver-with-functors/.
packages (and their dependencies) which are in explicit conflict with currently
installed ones (and those they depend on). As for the latter work and the work
presented in [1], our system enjoys a formal translation to a library for the Coq
theorem prover,2 with the aim of verifying its results. Our system seems also to
be the only one among those in the area of software management that relies on
the explicit formulation of a natural deduction calculus.
An essential characteristic of the method implemented in our system is that
integrity checking on installation profiles is guaranteed through an explicit for-
mulation of a trust access function on packages. The logic was first introduced
in [13] and extended to deal with negative trust in [12]. Recently, research has
started considering the advantages, implications and formal requirements needed
to deal with the various aspects of negated trust, and in particular the different
meanings that can be attached to mistrust and distrust, including the extension
and limits of their transitivity and propagation protocols [11, 6, 10, 17]. Most cur-
rent research ignores the difference between the procedural semantics of these two
terms, possibly with the exception of [10], which presents mistrust as misplaced
trust, untrust as little trust and distrust as no trust. This approach abstracts,
though, from the reasons behind the attribution of these evaluations, in favour
of a purely quantitative approach. Propagation for negative (first-order) trust is
formulated in [8]. Our contribution relies on a strict distinction between distrust
and mistrust : the former is intended as trust denied to packages coming from
outside of the current installation profile in view of inconsistencies with currently
installed ones; the latter is understood as trust revoked to installed packages,
in view of desired new packages to be installed. These two cases have not been
in general treated separately. Our approach formalises them in the context of
uninstall operations, which as far as we are aware are entirely missing from
the literature. Moreover, treating (un)install operations in terms of (un)trust
allows us to integrate a consistency check performed over profiles that satisfy
dependencies for the packages involved.
3 (un)SecureND
(un)SecureND is a natural deduction calculus defining trust, mistrust and dis-
trust protocols introduced in [13] for the positive fragment and in [12] for the
negation complete extension. We offer here a slightly modified version adapted
for the software management problems at hand. In particular, the present version
introduces a strict partial ordering on formulas to express package dependency;
this is then lifted at the level of contexts to express rules for installation profile
construction and finally imported at the level of repositories where the asso-
ciated packages are located. In view of this order relation the system qualifies
as a substructural logic, in that Weakening is constrained by a trust function,
Contraction and especially Exchange by the order relation.
We start with introducing the language of our logic:
2 The repository is available at https://github.com/gprimiero/SecureNDC.
Definition 4. (Syntax of (un)SecureND)
S∼ := {A < B < . . .}
φS := aS | ¬φSi | φSi → φSj | φSi ∧ φSj | φSi ∨ φSj | ⊥ | Read(φS) |Write(φS) | Trust(φS)
ΓS := φSi | φSi < φSj | ΓS ;φSj
3.1 Repositories, packages and dependencies
S∼ is the set of software repositories ordered by < in view of dependencies be-
tween packages they contain, obtained below as lifting from package dependency.
φS is a meta-variable for formulae, expressing software packages and their logi-
cal composition inductively defined by connectives, including operations to read
(query), trust (consistency checking) and write (install). The language includes⊥
to express conflicts: we formulate ¬φAi as an abbreviation for φAi → ⊥. Packages
are typed by their origin in repositories: φSi says that package φi can be retrieved
from repository S ∈ S. An installation profile ΓS is the list of all packages suf-
ficient to an access or execution operation; a profile is internally structured to
reflect the dependency of packages through the partial order < in S∼. We al-
low extension of profiles by packages that are not dependent on previous ones,
denoted by ΓS ;ΓS
′
= {φSi < . . . < φSn ;φS
′
n+1}. This construction allows us to
consider installation profiles that have all the sufficient conditions for the valid
execution of a package, but can also be extended with additional packages. When
such extension comes from the same repository, we use a comma: ΓS , φSi . The
partial order allows for branching in the hierarchy, so that e.g. φS1 < φ
S
2 < φ
S
3
and φS1 < φ
S
2 < φ
S
4 , i.e. packages φ
S
3 , φ
S
4 have both dependencies on φ
S
2 and
transitively on φS1 , but φ
S
3 , φ
S
4 could have no dependencies on each other.
Definition 5 (Judgements). An (un)SecureND-judgement φAi ` ψBj says that
a package ψj from repository B can be validly executed under a profile containing
package φi from repository A.
Definition 6 (Validity). An (un)SecureND-judgement ` φAi says that a pack-
age φi from repository A can be executed in any profile.
We now generalise the dependency relation between packages φAi < ψ
B
j at the
level of repositories. A partial order relation < over S × S intuitively expresses
that dependencies are satisfied across repositories.
Definition 7. A < B iff ∃φAi , ψBj s.t. φAi < ψBj and ¬∃φAk , ψBl s.t. ψBl < φAk .
By the first clause in Definition 7, A < B means that some package in A satisfies
a dependency for a package in B. By the second clause in Definition 7, our order
relation abstracts from the issue of reciprocal dependencies. As noted in [4], two
packages that mutually depend on each other will either be installed together,
or not installed at all. They can therefore be considered as a single package
for dependency resolution purposes. Rules from Figure 1 define installation pro-
files construction from packages dependencies. Here we use the extra-theoretical
Empty Profile{} : profile
` φAi
Package Insertion
φAi :profile
ΓA, φAi : profile Γ
A, φAi ` ψBj
Dependency Insertion
ΓA, φAi < ψ
B
j :profile
ΓA : profile ` ψBj
Profile Extension
ΓA;ψBj :profile
Fig. 1. The System (un)SecureND: Profile Construction Rules
typing declaration : profile to state that a formal expression can be consid-
ered a valid installation profile. By Empty Profile, an installation profile can be
empty (base case); by Package Insertion, the elements in an installation profile
are packages; by Dependency Insertion, a profile can be extended by satisfied
dependencies; by Profile Extension, if a package can be validly executed in an
empty profile, it can be added to an existing profile. Notice that unnecessary
packages from any repository can still be added: this is possible for packages
without dependencies through the Profile Extension rule, but more in general
by an application of the Weakening Rule (see Figure 4). The result of such a
profile extension is denoted by ΓA;φB and ΓA;ΓB . It is worth noting that Weak-
ening will preserve profile consistency as it requires additionally an instance of
the trust rule (see Figure 3).
3.2 Rules for package execution
The operational rules in Figure 2 formulate compositionality of package execu-
tion. A judgement of the form ΓA ` φB says that package φ from repository B
is executable without errors within an installation profile with packages coming
from repository A.
The rule Atom establishes valid package execution within the same instal-
lation profile and across repositories with satisfied dependencies. In the present
version we assume A < B. ⊥ says that if a profile is inconsistent, any package
whatsoever can be executed. ∧-I allows composition of packages from distinct
profiles; by ∧-E, each composing package can be obtained from the combined
profiles (with I = {A,B}). ∨-I says that a combined profile can access any pack-
age from each of the composing profiles; by the elimination ∨-E, each package
consistently inferred by each individual profile can also be executed under the ex-
tended profile.→-Introduction expresses inference of a package from a combined
profile as inference between packages (Deduction Theorem); its elimination→-E
allows to recover such inference as profile extension (Modus Ponens).
ΓA;ΓB : profile
Atom, for any ψBi ∈ ΓB
ΓA;ΓB ` ψBi
ΓA ` ⊥ ⊥
ΓA ` φB
ΓA ` φAi ΓB ` φBj ∧-I
ΓA;ΓB ` φAi ∧ φBj
ΓA;ΓB ` φAi ∧ φBj ∧-E
ΓA;ΓB ` φIi/j
ΓA;ΓB ` φIi/j ∨-I
ΓA;ΓB ` φAi ∨ φBj
ΓA;ΓB ` φAi ∨ φBj φI∈{A,B}i/j ` ψCk ∨-E
ΓA;ΓB ` ψCk
ΓA;φBi ` φCj →-I
ΓA ` φBi → φCj
ΓA ` φBi → φCj ΓA ` φBi →-E
ΓA;φBi ` φCj
Fig. 2. The System (un)SecureND: Operational Rules
3.3 Access Rules
In Figure 3 we present the access rules. These allow a user’s installation profile
to act on packages available from a distinct repository. In particular, we for-
mulate a rule to query a package from a repository (read) and one to install a
package within a profile (write). A third rule is formulated to guarantee that
only packages consistent with the installation profile can be installed (trust).
read says that from any consistent profile ΓA a package φBi can be read
provided its dependencies are satisfied (if any). trust works as an elimination
rule for read: it says that if a package φBi can be read and it preserves profile
consistency, then it can be trusted. write works as an elimination rule for trust: it
says that a readable and trustable package can be installed. exec says that every
package that is safely installed in a consistent profile can be executed in it. The
Introduction rule for distrust DTrust-I expresses the principle that a package
φBi non-consistent with its installation profile can be negated to be trustworthy;
the corresponding elimination DTrust-E uses →-introduction to induce write
of any package consistent with the conflict resolution. The Introduction rule
for mistrust MTrust-I says that trust is removed for local packages conflicting
with an intended installation (a queried package); the corresponding MTrust-E
allows to trust any package which is consistent with the conflict resolution by
removal of the mistrusted package in the installation profile. This holds for any
required dependency in other repositories, as expressed by the side condition that
requires checking for any C < B. By the latter set of rules, distrust is a flag for
preventing installation of conflicting external packages, while mistrust is a flag
for facilitating removal of conflicting packages present in the installation profile.
Notice that both untrust functions are triggered by the querying operation on a
repository, hence conflicts are highlighted before installation.
read
ΓA ` Read(φBi )
ΓA ` Read(φBi ) ΓA;φBi : profile
trust
ΓA ` Trust(φBi )
ΓA ` Read(φBi ) ΓA ` Trust(φBi )
write
ΓA `Write(φBi )
ΓA `Write(φBi )
exec
ΓA ` φBi
ΓA ` Read(φBi ) → ⊥
DTrust-I
ΓA ` ¬Trust(φBi )
ΓA ` ¬Trust(φBi ) ΓA ` ¬Trust(φBi ) → ψCj
DTrust-E
ΓA `Write(ψCj )
ΓA ` Read(ψBi ) → ⊥ ΓA \ {φAj } : profile
MTrust-I
ΓA \ {φAj };ψBi ` ¬Trust(φAj )
ΓA \ {φAj };ψBi ` ¬Trust(φAj ) ΓC ;ψBi : profile
MTrust-E, ∀C < B
ΓA \ {φAj };ΓC ` Trust(ψBi )
Fig. 3. The System (un)SecureND: Access Rules
3.4 Structural Rules
Structural rules hold with restrictions for (un)SecureND, see Figure 4. As a result
the system qualifies as substructural, see e.g. [14].
Weakening is constrained by an instance of trust: it says that a valid instal-
lation of φAi is preserved under a profile extension in view of a trusted package
φBj , i.e. one whose profile extension is provably consistent.
Contraction is constrained by preservation of package ordering: it says that
a valid installation of φAk is preserved when removing an instance of identical
packages φAi ;φ
B
i , provided one preserves the package from the higher repository
in the order dependency, so as to guarantee any further dependency below.
Exchange is doubly constrained by order: it says that a valid installation of
φAk is preserved under reorder of packages φi, φj , if those come from the same
repository A and if there is no involved dependency between them.
Finally, the Cut rule expresses valid package execution under profile exten-
sion: if a package φBi is validly executed under profile Γ
A and a profile ΓB in-
cluding φBi allows execution of a package φ
B
j , then the extended profile Γ
A;ΓB
allows execution of φBj .
ΓA `Write(φAi ) ΓA ` Trust(φBj )
Profile Weakening
ΓA;φBj `Write(φAi )
ΓA, φAi ;φ
B
i `Write(ψAk ) A < B
Profile Contraction
ΓA, φAi `Write(ψAk )
ΓA, φAi , φ
A
j `Write(φAk ) φAi ≮ φAj
Profile Exchange
ΓA, φAj , φ
A
i `Write(φAk )
ΓA ` φBi ΓB , φBi ` φBj
Profile Cut
ΓA;ΓB ` φBj
Fig. 4. The System (un)SecureND: Structural Rules
4 The Distrusted Uninstall Problem
Consider a profile ΓA = {φA1 < . . . < φAn } and a package φBm which one wishes
not to install. This might be due to a security constraint, or an explicit conflict
in view of an installed package φAi ∈ Γ , which one explicitly wants to preserve.
We call such a package φBm distrusted. In the calculus, this corresponds to the
conclusion of the DTrust-I rule
ΓA ` ¬Trust(φBm)
The Distrusted Uninstall Problem is to determine which packages can be
installed in ΓA that do not depend on φBm. Our formulation allows to express
this principle as the request to obtain the maximal set of formulas {ψNi } from
any repository N ≥ B such that
ΓA ` ¬Trust(φBm)→ {ψNi }
By DTrust-E, this guarantees the right to install ψNi . The first step consists
in transforming our problem in a formulation that removes the trust condition.
Lemma 1. ΓA ` ¬Trust(φBm)→ ψNi iff ΓA;¬φBm ` ψNi .
Proof. For the left-to-right direction: By the assumption ΓA ` ¬Trust(φBm) and
consistency of negation, ΓA ` Trust(¬φBm); similarly, from the premise ΓA `
¬Trust(φBm) → ψNi and consistency of negation we get ΓA ` Trust(¬φBm) →
ψNi . Now apply write to Trust(¬φBm) and eliminate the function through exec;
by →-E we obtain ΓA;¬φBm ` ψNi .
For the right-to-left direction: By the assumption ΓA;¬φBm ` ψNi it holds
ΓA;¬φBm : profile, which justifies ΓA ` Read(¬φBm) by read, ΓA ` Trust(¬φBm)
by the previous and trust and ΓA ` ¬Trust(φBm) by ¬-distribution. It fol-
lows ΓA;¬Trust(φBm) ` ψNi by substitution from the assumption, and ΓA `
¬Trust(φBm)→ ψNi is obtained by →-I.
We can now reduce the latter to an operation on all packages coming from
the repository involved by the distrust operation:
Lemma 2. If ΓA;¬φBm ` ψNi then ΓA;ΓB \ {φBm} ` ψNi , for all consistent
profiles ΓB that include φBm.
Proof. ΓA can be extended with every consistent package from B; by definition
ΓA;¬φBm ` ¬Trust(φBm), hence by Weakening this is possible except for φBm as
it does not satisfy trust.
The above corresponds to finding the maximal set of formulas in ΓB that
allows to execute ψNi without requiring φ
B
m in the profile. To this aim, it is enough
to find all φBl ≯ φBm, i.e. the set of packages in B that have no dependencies from
φBm.
What has been so far restricted to one repository, can now be generalised to
any repository that preserves the dependency condition:
Lemma 3. ΓA;φNl ` Write(ψNi ) iff (φNl ≮ ξNm ≮ ψNi ) for any distrusted pack-
age ξNm and any repository N > A.
Proof. For the right-to-left direction. Assume the following: ΓA;φNl `Write(φNi )
and ΓA;φNl ` ¬Trust(φNm). Then: if φNl < φNm, then ΓA;φNl ` φNm by Atom,
contradicting the distrust assumption; and if φNm < φ
N
i then similarly φ
N
m ` φNi
and by Weakening it is possible to obtain ΓA;φNl , φ
N
m ` Write(φNi ), again con-
tradicting the distrust assumption.
For the left-to-right direction. Assume (φNl ≮ φNm ≮ φNi ) and ΓA;φNl `
¬Trust(φNm). Then: because φNl ≮ φNm, the second assumption above does not
require to remove φNl as by Lemma 2; and because φ
N
m ≮ φNi , installing the
latter does not require installing the former. Hence ΓA;φNl `Write(φNi ) holds.
Finally, our main result is obtained:
Theorem 1. (Distrusted Uninstall) Given a package φBm distrusted under
profile ΓA, a package ψNi can be installed in Γ
A iff φBm ≮ ψNi .
Proof. From Definition 2 and Lemma 3 by substitution.
This last result identifies distrusted packages as those that have at least a
dependency from one package conflicting with the current installation profile.
5 The Mistrusted Uninstall Problem
Consider a profile ΓA = {φA1 < . . . < φAn } and a package φBm which one wishes to
install in it: in the calculus, this corresponds to the conclusion of an instance of
the Write rule, ΓA ` Write(φBm). Assume that φBm is in conflict with the given
profile
ΓA ` Read(φBm)→ ⊥
The Mistrusted Uninstall Problem is to determine the set ΦA = {φAi ∈ ΓA |
φAi → ¬φBm} which should be removed when installing φBm. We will call any such
package φAi a mistrusted package. Hence the problem is to identify the minimal
set of formulas ΦA such that for each φAi ∈ ΦA
ΓA \ ΦA;φBm ` ¬Trust(φAi )
and by MTrust-E, given any other set of formulas ΓC required by φBm, it
allows
ΓA \ ΦA;ΓC ` Trust(φBm)
We start by identifying the minimal subset of packages from the current
installation profile that satisfies the conflict:
Lemma 4. If ΓA ` Read(φBm) → ⊥, then ∃ΦA ⊆ ΓA such that ΦA = {φAi <
. . . < φAn } ` Read(φBm)→ ⊥.
Proof. ∀φAi , φAj ∈ ΓA, if φAi ` Read(φBm) → ⊥ and φAi < φAj , then φAj `
Read(φBm) → ⊥. And ∀φAh < φAi , φAh ` Read(φBm). Hence it suffices to iden-
tify the maximal φAi in conflict with φ
B
m and to include it in Φ
A together with
all packages in ΓA that depend on it. We will call ΦA a maximally mistrusted
set.
Lemma 5. Consider a maximally mistrusted ΦA ⊆ ΓA such that ΦA ` Read(φBm)→
⊥ as of Lemma 4. Then ∀φAi ∈ ΦA, φAi < Read(φBm)→ ⊥.
Proof. This holds by construction of ΦA in Lemma 4 and the Dependency In-
sertion Rule.
Lemma 6. If φAi ` Read(φBm)→ ⊥, then φAi ≮ φBm.
Proof. Starting from φAi ` Read(φBm) → ⊥ we apply D-Trust-I, ¬-distribution,
write and exec to obtain φAi ` ¬φBm, from which we obtain φAi < ¬φBm from
Dependency Insertion and φAi ≮ φBm by contrapposition.
Theorem 2. (Mistrusted Uninstall) Given a package φBm to be installed un-
der profile ΓA, a package φAi is mistrusted in Γ
A iff for all ΓA ⊆ {φAi < φAj }
1. ΓA ` φAj → ¬φBm,
2. φAj < Read(φ
B
m)→ ⊥ and
3. φAi ≮ φBm.
Proof. The first condition is required by Lemma 5 to include all the dependencies
in the maximally mistrusted set. The second condition holds from Lemma 6.
Finally, the third condition holds by contradiction: if φAi < φ
B
m, then φ
A
i ` φBm
by Dependency Insertion; it follows by Weakening that φAi ;φ
B
m : profile and
hence φB ` Trust(φAi ).
This last result identifies packages to be removed as those that are in max-
imally mistrusted set and do not satisfy any dependency for the package to be
installed under the current profile.
6 An Example
Consider the simple scenario presented in Section 1 where a user has the following
installation profile:
Γm−f−nf

Γmain = {φm1 , φm2 }
Γ free = {ψf1 }
Γnonfree = {ξnf1 }

with the following dependencies
Γm−f−nf

φm1 < ψ
f
1
φm2 < ψ
f
1
ψf1 < ξ
nf
1

Assume the user distrusts a package ψfn, e.g. because it is considered harmful or
unsecure. The Distrusted Uninstall Problem asks which packages can be further
installed in Γm−f−nf without installing ψfn. Consider now a package ψ
f
2 ≯ ψfn,
then the following derivation holds:
D
Γm−f−nf ` ¬Trust(ψfn)
D’
Γm−f−nf ` Read(ψf2 ) ψfn ≮ ψf2
Γm−f−nf `Write(ψf2 )
In other words, flagging ψfn as distrustful does not impede the installation of a
package ψf2 if the latter does not depend on the former.
Assume moreover that the user wishes to install an additional package ξnf2 >
φm1 , but such that φ
m
2 ` Read(ξnf2 ) → ⊥: in other words, ξnf2 depends on φm1 ,
but is in conflict with φm2 (which is possible, given the latter does not depend
on φm1 ). Then assuming a package ψ
f
2 replacing the functionalities of φ
m
2 , the
following derivation holds:
φm2 ` Read(ξnf2 )→ ⊥ φm2 < ψf1
Γm−f−nf \ {φm2 < ψf1 }; ξnf2 ` ¬Trust(φm2 < ψf1 ) ψf2 ; ξnf2 : profile
Γm−f−nf \ {φm2 < ψf1 }; ξnf2 `Write(ψf2 )
In other words the installation of ξnf2 requires removing φ
m
2 < ψ
f
1 and it is
compatible with the installation of ψf2 .
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have formulated two variants to the Uninstall Problem. Each
relies on a different semantic qualification of untrusted packages required to be
removed or prevented from installation in a given installation profile, in order to
preserve consistency.
Our approach is grounded on the logic (un)SecureND, including an explicit
trust function on formulas to guarantee consistency check at each retrieval step
(after a read function), before installation rights are granted for a package (by a
write function). The fragment of the language presented in this paper allows to
express negation over trust as a dis-installation requirement. Different pairs of
introduction/elimination rules determine the selection of one of two resolution
strategies: one flags a package external to the installation profile as distrusted
and hence as not installable; the other identifies already installed packages to
be removed. The selection takes care of identifying and removing all required
dependencies. We have illustrated the working protocol through an easy example.
As already mentioned, validation of the system is obtained by implementation of
the (un)SecureND calculus as a large inductive type in the Coq proof assistant.
The development is available at https://github.com/gprimiero/SecureNDC.
A characteristic of the logic (un)SecureND is its substructural nature, which
in future work can be exploited to investigate cases of strengthened and lim-
ited resource redundancy for fault tolerance and source shuffling for security.
Other applications of negative trust can be investigated to distinguish between
malevolent and simply unsuccessful sources.
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